The West sees China’s rise as a challenge to its hegemony. For the Chinese this is merely the restoration of the natural order of things—of China as the world’s largest economy and the center of the world.
对于中国的崛起，西方视之为对自身霸权的挑战，而对中国人而言，这只是自然秩序的恢复--中国是世界上最大的经济体也是世界的中心
What makes the West particularly nervous is that China has shattered two important misconceptions: first the expectation that as China modernised it would become increasingly Western; second the idea that single-party rule by the Communist Party of China would inevitably give way to demands for Western-style democracy. Many in the West thought that China would be integrated into the Western economic and political order as Japan was after World War II.
是什么让西方人特别紧张，因为中国粉碎了两个重要的错误理念：第一，西方人认为随着中国的现代化进程，中国会越来越西化。第二，中国共产党的一党专政必然被西式民主取代。很多西方国家都认为，日本在二战之后接受了西方的政治经济制度，中国也会步日本后尘。然而故事却不是这么发展的。
But that’s not how the story has unfolded. Moving forward we should expect continued assertion and pursuit of its interests by China—both in its neighborhood and on the world stage.
往后，中国将继续在周边范围和世界舞台上主张和追求自身利益
CHINA RISING
中国的崛起
Rather than become more Western China’s polity and society remain stubbornly Chinese. If anything the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grip on power in China is stronger than ever. And China has made it clear that while it is a major beneficiary of the U.S.-led era of open markets free trade and investment flows it is also determined to have an independent say in the economic political and security order in its region and in the world.
中国没有更西化，而是坚定的保持了中国本色。party的权力空前稳固。而中国业已表明，在美国主导的时代，中国是市场开放，贸易投资自由的主要受益者，现在，中国也要求在政经领域和维持区域和世界秩序方面，有自己的独立话语权。
After the 2008 global economic crisis China doubled down on its efforts to shape its region using its economic strength to build connectivity and institutions consolidating the Eurasian landmass. It launched the “One Belt One Road” initiative created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS New Development Bank and negotiated the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP as opposed to the U.S.-sponsored Trans-Pacific Partnership). China also promoted the use of the renminbi as an international currency and promoted regional trade—10 years ago all except one of China’s neighbors traded more with the United States than with China; today China is the largest trading partner of all its neighbors. Faced with Western sanctions Russia looks to China to buy the energy and commodity exports on which it depends. Even the United States China’s main strategic competitor is economically tied to China in fundamental ways.
08年全球金融危机后，中国加倍努力，利用其经济力量推动欧亚大陆的互联互通，打造自己的势力范围。中国发起一带一路倡议，建立亚投行和金砖国家新开发银行，协商区域全面经济伙伴关系（即RCEP，以抗衡美国发起的TPP）。中国推动人民币国际化，促进区域贸易---10年前，中国邻国中只有一个国家对中交易多于对美交易，而现在，中国是其所有邻国的最大贸易伙伴。受西方制裁的俄罗斯寻求中国合作，向中国出口所需的能源和大宗商品，而主要战略对手美国，也在经济的基本方面与中国关联密切
All of these moves will have global impact as the Asia-Pacific is increasingly the center of gravity of the global economy and politics. It is also the locus of political contention between the old Western order and a new emerging one.
这些举措将会产生全球性影响，因为亚太地区正日益成为全球经济和政治的重心，它也是旧的西方秩序与新兴势力的政治争夺焦点。
MANAGING GROWTH EXPECTATIONS
调整增长预期
Internally China’s rapid economic growth gave the CCP legitimacy. The CCP today is a victim of its own success: With an $11 trillion-economy and per capita income of almost $14000 China cannot sustain 10 percent-plus growth rates forever. It also needs to readjust its economy from a reliance on exports and government-led investment to internal demand and consumption-led growth.
中国经济的快速增长巩固了party的合法性。但party也受累于自身的成功：如今中国经济规模达11兆美元，人均收入近14000美元，但它不可能永远维持两位数的经济增长率。另外中国还需调整经济结构，改变依赖出口和政府主导投资的现状，拉动内需，向消费主导型增长转型。
Can it make this adjustment without a major internal economic crisis? A command economy like China—where government has fiscal and other tools not available in market economies—should find it possible to transition to a lower growth path of about 3 to 5 percent GDP growth each year. It won’t be easy and it will cause social pain. In fact the social consequences of the nature and speed of China’s growth have actually diminished the CCP’s ability to control the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens as have the effects of the information communication technology revolution. The CCP must now look for new sources of ideological legitimacy while trying to use modern technology to buttress its hold on power.
中国能够避开重大内部危机完成经济调整么？中国是计划经济，政府拥有市场经济体所没有的财政调控工具以及其他手段，应该可以过渡到GDP年增长率3%-5%的较低的水平，过程无疑是困难而痛苦的。事实上，中国的经济增长类型和增长速度带来的社会后果，加上信息技术革命的发展，减弱了party对公民日常生活的掌控。因此party需要寻求新的角度来证实其意识形态的正确性，也需要借助更高新的科技手段来强化权力掌控（这是说不许咱翻墙么。。。。）
What does China’s rise in this form mean for the world?
中国以这种形式崛起，对世界而言，意味着什么？
As China tries to avoid the middle income trap and as economic growth slows the CCP turns increasingly to nationalism to provide legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. Hence some of the recent shrillness in Chinese responses to external events. In the past China’s stated foreign policy goals were modest and humble—it has now dropped those. It now officially describes itself as a great power implicitly an equal of the United States.
随着经济放缓，中国试图避免“中等收入陷阱，party也频频借助民族主义来确保国民对其政权合法性的认可。因此，在最近的一些外交事件中中国态度强硬。曾经中国奉行谦虚谦逊的外交政策，如今。。。俱往矣。。。。。中国现在将自己定位为与美国相当的强国。
China’s economic growth has enabled it increase defense spending by double digits for over 25 years. Since 2008 it has reignited maritime disputes in the East China Sea with Japan and in the South China Sea with Vietnam and other ASEAN members—and has begun a much more muscular defense of an expanded definition of its core interests.
中国的经济增长使其能够连续25年保持国防开支两位数增率。自2008以来，它在东海与日本，在南海与越南等东盟国家发生领海纠纷，中国也开始采用更强硬的手段来捍卫核心利益
What does this presage for China’s future behaviour? Scholars’ predictions run the spectrum from China’s imminent collapse to a China that will “rule the world.” The truth is somewhere in between and much more complex.
这预示着中国未来的行为会是怎样呢？学者们的预测相差甚远，从中国即将崩溃到中国将“统治世界”都有。其实在某些方面是介于两者之间且复杂得多。
History has left China with a fear of barbarian encirclement and a strong drive to “maintain face” after what the Chinese regard as “a century of humiliation” and colonial degradation. The goals that China pursues in the international system today are a direct result of this narrative of Chinese history which the CCP has appropriated to argue that only the Communist Party can realize and restore China’s pride. In short history and the trauma of the long 19th century left China self-centered touchy lonely and seeking respect.
在经历了所谓“百年屈辱”和殖民退化的历史后，中国惧怕蛮族包围，并有强大的动力去“保住面子”。在今天的国际体系中，中国奉行的目标正是中国历史诉求的直接结果，也为中共所冒功，称只有共产党才能实现和恢复中国的荣耀。19世纪只是历史的一瞬，却是漫长的创伤，留给中国以自我为中心的敏感、孤独和寻求尊重。
These are heightened by the effects of geography and China’s present condition. Unlike the United States which is protected by two of the world’s largest oceans China is in a crowded neighborhood and shares borders with 14 countries. It has only two allies—Pakistan and North Korea—and has difficult relations with some neighbors (namely Japan India and Vietnam) that have also been accumulating hard and soft power. Rising nationalist rhetoric in China and the region has contributed to a worsening of her relations with most of its neighbors.
这些又为地理环境影响和中国现状而增强。不像美国受世界上最大的两个海洋保护，中国邻国众多，与14个国家接壤。它只有两个盟友－巴基斯坦和朝鲜，并与一些也积累了硬实力和软实力的邻国（即日本、印度和越南）关系紧张。在中国和该地区日益增长的民族主义言论加剧了她与大多数邻国关系恶化。
Despite the considerable strides that China has made in acquiring power it still lacks the capability to manage devise or impose a political or security order in the Asia-Pacific. This is a function not just of the balance of power and the presence of the United States but of its inability to offer a normative frxwork and of the nature of its relations with significant countries like India Japan Vietnam Indonesia Russia and others.
尽管中国在获取权力方面取得长足进展，它仍然缺少在亚太地区整合理念或者导入政治或安全秩序的能力。这种功能不光是处理权力平衡和美国的存在，而是它无力提供一个规范性的框架，也天然地包括处理与印度、日本、越南、印尼、俄罗斯等重要国家和其他国家关系。
If China cannot—and the United States doesn’t—provide security in the global commons through alliances and bases we should expect continued instability in the Asia-Pacific. Optimists and those who want to change the status quo like China call it multipolarity and welcome it as instability offers space to pursue their interests and improve their position.
如果中国未能——而美国也没有——通过结盟和基地在全球领域提供安全，我们只能预料亚太地区仍将不稳定。乐观主义者和那些希望改变现状的人欢迎中国所谓的多极化，因为不稳定才会给他们追求利益和提高地位的空间。
Can the world economy recover and prosper amidst such political and security instability? I think not. The natural reaction to prolonged insecurity and strategic competition would be to form countervailing coalitions and alliances formal or informal—I suspect we will see more of that.
在政局动荡安全不稳的情况下世界经济能够复苏繁荣么？我想是不能的，长期处于不安全的环境和战略竞争之中，人们的自然反应就是建立各种正式非正式的联盟相互对抗---我猜我们将会看到很多这样的情况
Just as its professed dedication to freedom or democracy has never been an accurate predictor of U.S. behavior China’s professions of win-win diplomacy Confucian benevolence and economic priorities are unlikely to indicate future Chinese behavior. Instead the drivers of Chinese foreign policy are likely to remain the quest for status and to acquire power— political military and economic. The only consideration that might override them in unlikely circumstances is regime continuity in China. If rule by the CCP elite is threatened by the consequences of the drive for status and power that push will be limited or modified. But for the present expect more of the “assertive” China.
美国曾自诩重视民主自由，可言行却不一致。由此可见，虽然中国自称奉行双赢外交，实行儒家仁政，以发展经济为优先任务，以后也不见得就会真的这么做。相反，中国外交政策的驱动力可能仍然是在政治军事经济各方面寻求地位和攫取权力。唯一能让他们忧心的就是逆境中如何保持政权的连续性。如果追求地位和权利带来的结果会威胁到party的精英统治，他们也许会有所收敛改正。但是目前，更可能出现的是一个“坚定自信”的中国。